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REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Is a Strict Liability State in More Ways than One, 
The Defense opens its response argument with this declaration: '·Idaho has only adopted the 
concept of strict liability in cases dealing with the seller of a defective product to a consumer," (Res. 
Br. P. 10). 
Actually, Idaho recognizes strict liability in a myriad of circumstances. For example, Idaho 
recognizes strict liability at common law of a bailee for the misdelivery of goods. Quinto v. 
1Willwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 938 P.2d 189 (1997). 
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law of a corporation for the crimes of its agent. 
State v. Adjustment Dep 't Credit Bureau. Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 158-59, 483 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1971). 
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for commercial carriers who fail to safely 
transport goods. lvfclntosh v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 17 Idaho 100, 105 P.66 (1909). 
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for livestock dealers who fail to pay for 
purchased cattle. US Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 452 P.2d 
993 (I 969). 
Under Idaho Code § 6-320 Idaho recognizes strict liability for a landlord who fails to keep 
the premises safe for tenants. (Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 233 P.3d 1 (2008)). 
Under Idaho Code§ 6-210 Idaho recognizes strict liability of a parent for harm done by a 
minor child. 
Under Idaho Code§ 25-2806 Idaho recognizes strict liability of an owner of a dog that injures 
poultry or livestock. 
In the criminal realm, Idaho recognizes strict liability for injury caused by a defendant guilty 
of aggravated DUI, LC.§ 18-8006. State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2005); Idaho 
recognizes strict liability without criminal negligence for failure to affix illegal drug stamps. State 
v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199,204, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003); for vehicular manslaughter, 
Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 786 P.2d 580 (1990); for statutory rape, State v. Stffjler, 117 Idaho 
405,410, 788 P.2d 220 (1990); for sale of securities when not licensed, State v. lvfontgomery, 135 
Idaho 348, 17 P.3d 292 (2001); and for driving without a valid driver's license. State v. Taylor, 139 
Idaho 402, 80 P.3d 338 (2002). 
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An employer is also strictly liable for statutory penalties for failure to secure payment for 
workers compensation. Heese v. A & T Trucking, l 02 Idaho 598, 63 5 P .2d 962 (1981 ). 
Last, and most importantly, Idaho recognizes common law strict liability, and strict premises 
liability, in dogbite cases when an ov.ner or harborer of a dog knows or ought to know the dog will 
cause injury. J;fcClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass 'n. 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). 
In ,'vicClain the Idaho Supreme Court declared: 
If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure any one,[ sic] in person or 
property, if they are rightfully in the place where they do the mischief, the owner of 
such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that they were accustomed 
to do mischief; and, in suits for such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged and 
proved, for, unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the 
owner had such knowledge, he is liable. 
104 P. at 1016. 
Although the wording is not word-for-word exactly the same, the sentiment of the declaration 
oflaw is identical to that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513 (1977): 
The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who 
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming 
upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to their 
entry or otherwise. 
The sentiments of both statements are identical. It doesn't matter whether Zoey was behind 
a gate where she belonged. It wouldn't matter if the gate had been put up to keep Zoey from biting 
people, although it wasn't. It was erected to keep Mary's Shih Tzu from urinating on the living room 
carpet. It doesn't matter if Steve Boswell was there as an invitee or a licensee. 
Under either the declaration of law in lvfclain, or the declaration of law in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 513 (1977), the outcome is the same. The harborer of the dog is strictly liable 
to anyone coming onto the property whether invitee or licensee if the dog is knovvn to bite. 
The Defense's opening declaration, and twice more repeated in their brief, is: "Idaho has only 
adopted the concept of strict liability on cases dealing -with a seller of a defective product to a 
consumer," "Again. the only time strict liability has been allowed in Idaho is in products liability 
cases," and "The District Court properly followed Idaho law, which does not recognize strict 
liability in cases other than products liability.'' But such is not the law in Idaho. 
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Some matters in the law just lend themselves to the application of strict liability. Harboring 
a child who destroys others' property is one of them. (J.C.§ 6-210). Harboring a dog that injures 
others· chickens and sheep is another. (LC.§ 25-2806). And harboring a dog that bites other people's 
hands is another. (A.fcClain. supra.). 
B. Idaho Law on Domestic Animals Is Broad Enough to Cover Dogbite. 
Since the declaration oflaw from AfcC!ain speaks only of a dog "rightfully in the place where 
they do the mischief, the Defense adheres to the view that it is not possible to extrapolate an Idaho 
position on dogbite law irrespective of whether or not the dog is ·'rightfully in its place." Plaintiffs 
hold to the opposite view. If, as the Restatement says, and as AkClain says: a dog owner is strictly 
liable for a mischievous dog when the dog is in its rightful place: then a fortiori, an owner who 
knows a dog will bite is also strictly liable whether the dog is at home or elsewhere. Just as the 
Restarement says: 
(1) A possessor a domestic animal that he knmvs or has reason to know has 
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by 
the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from 
doing the harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 509 (1977). 
And just as the newer Restatement says: 
An ovvner or possessor of an animal that the o,vner or possessor knows or has reason 
to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to 
strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues from that 
dangerous tendency. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010). 
The AkC!ain declaration, the Restatement (Second) declarations on premises liability and 
dogbite liability, and the Restatement (Third) declaration on dogbite liability are also completely 
consistent with the Idaho Code § 25-2805(b) which provides: 
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or 
otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful 
for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to 
harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one from 
which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by the 
owner of the premises or owner of the animal. 
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Just like AfcCiain,just like the Restatements. the Idaho Code does not distinguish between 
dogbite injuries to licensees or invitees only trespassers. The argument over invitee vs. licensee is 
the proverbial red herring. The Idaho Code does not excuse dogs ·'in their rightful place.'· A '·secure 
enclosure" is the only insurance for the owner of a vicious dog. What constitutes a secure enclosure 
is a question of fact appropriate for a jury to decide. It is not appropriate to dispose of on summary 
judgment. 
C. Silence on the Law Does Not Mean the Defense Prevails. 
The law in Idaho, at least until novv, has never been if the Plaintiff cannot cite to Idaho 
precedent the Defense automatically prevails. One reason this Court has adopted the Restatement 
237 times out of the last 240 the Restatement on Torts has been considered is because Idaho doesn't 
always have a prior decision directly on every point of law. That does not mean, that the Plaintiff 
has no cause of action due to lack of precedent. 
Assuming, arguendo, we ignore AfcClain; we assume AfcClain is not directly on point, or 
that its statement of the law is dicta, it does not follow that Idaho rejects strict liability for repeat 
offender canines. It does not follow that Idaho rejects the Restatements. It does not follow that 
Idaho rejects the majority view held by other states. Even assuming 1\i1cClain is insufficient in itself 
to substantiate the positive, that does not automatically establish the negative. At least Plaintiffs 
have one case in their favor. Defendants have none. 
Idaho law is not silent on the liability of an owner of a dog that is kno"'n to do mischief. 
lvfcClain. Just as the Defendants' err in declaring that Idaho only recognizes strict liability is in the 
case of products liability, Defendants also err in declaring ·'the law is well settled that there is no 
strict liability in dogbite cases in Idaho." (Res. Br. P. 33. 1, 1) 
The Defense believes that because the AfcClain case involved a large Greyhound that 
trespassed onto a race track, the principle of law enunciated in AfcClain cannot be generalized 
beyond the specific facts of the case. The Defense's reading of AfcClain is so narrow that the 
principles of law in that case would not apply to a dog biting, to a horse kicking, or a bull charging, 
but only to a Greyhound, a large one at that, that runs onto a race track; the principle of law would 
not apply if the dog was a Doberman or a German Shepherd. 
Reply Brief 
4 
The McClain case is recognized in Supreme Court decisions of two other states as standing 
for the proposition that if a dog mvner has knowledge that the dog has a propensity to do injury, the 
owner is accountable. Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637, 639-40, 254 P.2d 210,211 (1953); Barber v. 
Hocksrrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 80, 54 A.2d 458. 560 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The McClain case is recognized 
by at least four secondary sources as standing for the same proposition. Allison E. Butler, 33 
Causes ofAcrion 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007) p. 52; Adam P. Karp, J.D., M.S. 38 Causes 
a/Action 2d 281 (originally published in 2008) p. 42; 38 Causes of Action 2d 281 [Cumulative 
Supplement] p. 5; George Ducker, Ph.D. Esq., Animal Wrongs: On Holding Animals to (and 
Excusing Them from) Legal Responsibility for Their Intentional Acts. 2 ]Animal L. & Eth. 91, 121 
(2007). At least the Plaintiffs have the /vfcClain case, two opinions of other state courts applying 
lvfcClain, and four secondary sources. So far, neither party presents any authority to the contrary. 
Even if precedent does not prove Idaho is a strict liability state, the law does not default to 
conclude Idaho is not a strict liability state. The default is to address the matter as an issue of first 
impression. The approach to handle a matter of first impression is set by Idaho Code § 73-116, i.e. 
to follow the common law1• The common law on dogbite is recognized as being embodied in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 509 (1977). Borns v. Gannon, 2003 Wyo. 74, 70 P.3d 262,266 
(2003). The Defense has yet to acknowledge the Restatements, or address them. The silence of any 
authority to say Idaho is not a strict liability speaks volumes. 
D. Issues of Fact Should Be Given to the Jury. 
If the "Boswells failed to meet their burden of establishing their negligence, negligence per 
se and premises liability claims" (Res. Br. P.33, 1. 2-3) it is because they were deprived of a trial 
where thev would have had to meet that burden. Setting aside strict liabilitv for now and addressing 
.,I '--' ,.; ._, 
Plaintiffs' other claims of negligence, several issues of disputed fact were treated as issues of law. 
Several others were construed against the plaintiffs despite ample disputation of the Defense's 
version of the facts: 
Whether a canine puncture that draws blood is a meaningless "nip" or a portentous "bite" 
is a question of fact for a jury. Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008). 
1 I.C. §73-116. Common law in force 
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Likewise, irrespective of its characterization as --nipping" or .. biting" whether such 
penetration of human flesh constitutes notice of a vicious propensity is a question of fact for a jury 
to decide. Earl v. Piowaty, 42 A.D.3d 865, 839 N.Y.S.2d 861, (2007): Haberman v. Babai, 21 
Misc. 2d 1093, 14 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1959); Rogers by Rogers v. Travis, 229 A.D.2d 879,646 ~.Y.S.2d 
206 ( 1996). Whether the owner of a dog has superior knowledge to the injured victim is a question 
of fact forthe jury to decide. Willis v. Neal, 179 Ga. App. 732, 34 7 S.E.2d 700 (1986). 
Whether a dog was provoked before it bit is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Toney 
v. Bouthillier, 129 Ariz. 402,631 P.2d 557 (1981); Bailey by Bailey v. l'vforris, 323 N.W. 2d 785 
(1982): Engquist v. Loyas, 787 N.W.2d 220 (2010); Ward ex rel. Wardv. Freiderich, Not Reported 
in N.W.2d (2006). 
Even if we assume arguendo that it matters, Defense applies the wrong standard as to 
whether Steve Boswell was a licensee or an invitee. The Defense words the standard as follows: 
"Mr. Boswell was not an invitee; rather, he was a social guest or licensee, as he 
rendered an incidental service to Mary Boswell he drove her home ane never 
conferred any money, business of commercial benefit to Mary Steele." 
In fact, the standard is actually as follows: 
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected 
with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the 
visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit to the 
landowner. 
Ball v. City of Blaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673,677,273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012). 
Steve Boswell provided transportation to Mary Steele to a party she wanted to go to. He 
provided her the ride home. He conferred a tangible benefit to her. More importantly, the status of 
licensee or invitee is an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Willis v. Neal, 179 Ga. App. 732, 34 7 
S.E.2d 700 (1986); Ambort v. Nowlin, 289 Ark.124, 70 S.W.2d 407 (1986). 
Historians note well the infamous princjple that "if you repeat something frequently enough 
people will sooner or later believe it." But repetition does not resolve issues of fact. The Defense 
says, eleven times in their opposition brief, that Steve Boswell came at the dog with a closed fist. 
Steve explained that he was only repeating the Defense's choice of words (fist) when he described 
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approaching the dog with the back of his hand, fingers curled together. (R. 325) Whether Steve was 
trying to threaten the dog with a poke on the nose with his fist, or, as he says, he \Vas approaching the 
dog with the back of his hand, is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Although it was disputed, 
that issue got treated as undisputed fact because the Defense repeated it and repeated it and repeated 
it. 
And on that subject, whether a closed fist is or is not a threat to a dog is also an issue of fact 
for the finder of fact. 
Whether the dog was growling, as stated three times in the response brief, or as Steve testified: 
"the dog was not growling but barking and wagging its tail," (R.219, L.15 of page 32). is a question 
of fact for the jury to decide. 
Whether as stated five times, Steve Boswell reached over the fence, or as Steve testified 
vehemently, he never reached over the fence, but the dog reached over the fence to take off the back 
of his hand, (R. 219, L. 25-8 of pp. 31-32) is a question of fact for the jury to decide. 
Credibility of witnesses is also an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Bradley v. Hendricks, 
251 Ark. 733,474 S.\V.2d 677 (1972). 
\v'hether, as represented six times, Defendants had no warning the dog was dangerous ( despite 
two previous biting incidents!), or as represented twice that Zoey was only being protective, or three 
times that Steve did not think Mary or Amber did anything \\!Tong, even though Steve testified Mary 
should have warned him the dog would bite (R. 230, L.4-15 of page 35), all of these issues are issues 
of fact for the jury. The subjective opinion that the attack was provoked by Steve, the random 
representation that Steve was bringing Mary home from a family gathering, (which he was not) 
though repeated incessantly does not make them reality. 
Simply put, the district court took from the jury issues that were clearly in the purview of the 
jury as the trier of fact. Summary judgment should not have been granted against Steve and Karena 
Boswell. All these matters are issues of fact for a jury. If reasonable persons could reach different 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied." (Respondents' Brief 
pages 8-9, citing Smith v. A1eridianJoint School District No.2. 128 Idaho 714, 718,918 P.2d 583,587 
(1996)). 
F. Pocatello Municipal Code§ 604.050 E Creates a Private Cause of Action. 
The Defendants' response raises a host of issues not ripe for review because they were never 
ruled on by the Trial Court. \Vbile the proper way to address them is to let the District Court address 
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them first, as a precautionary measure Plaintiffs will address the Defenses claim that Pocatello 
Municipal Code§§ 6.04.0 l 0 et seq. does not create a private cause of action. Clearly it does. Section 
6.04.050 E provides: 
E. Owner Liabilitv. An adult owner/custodian of a vicious animal shali be liable for 
all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or domestic animal caused 
by an unprovoked attack by any vicious animal, plus all costs, civil judgments or 
penalties, criminal fines, final terms, and any other penalties and orders .... 
(Emphasis added). 
The code clearly intends to provide personal relief for injuries. Civil damages cannot be 
recovered unless obtained through a civil action. The Municipal Ordinance provides both a right and 
a remedy. 
In 1.Weade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54, 66-67 (1969) this Court declared the 
following concerning private rights of action: 
The violation of a statutory provision containing a mandate to do an act for the benefit 
of another, or a prohibition against the doing of an act which may he to his injury, 
is generally regarded as giving rise to a liability and creating a private right of 
action, whenever the other elements essential to a recovery are present. This is true 
regardless of actual negligence on the part of the violator of the statute, and although 
no actions are given in express terms by the statute. Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 93 
Idaho 122,456 .2d 766, filed July 9, 1969. The test whether an individual injured 
by the violation of a statue may recover from the wrongdoer has been declared to 
he whether the legislature intended to give such right. 
Nfeade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 401-02, 462 P.2d 54, 66-67 (1969) overruled on other grounds by 
Alegriav. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980). (Emphasis added). 
This standard enunciated in ,Heade fits the parameters of the Pocatello Municipal Code as 
snugly as a custom made glove. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Defense has premised its defense on several untenable premises. First, that 
Idaho only recognizes strict liability in products liability cases. Second, that Idaho law is silent on 
dogite liability. Third, that it is Plaintiffs' duty to produce precedent on every point of law, and if 
Plaintiffs fail, the law is always in the Defense's favor. Fourth, it is the prerogative of the court to 
draw legal conclusions as to whether a canine injury that draws blood is a bite or a nip; and if it's a 
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nip, whether a nip counts as bad behavior or "just being protective:" whether such 'just protective·' 
biting is acceptable behavior for a domestic dog; and whether reaching a hand towards a dog is, as 
a matter of law, such provocation as would justify any dog in removing the hand. 
And finally, the Defense relies on its reading of the Pocatello Municipal Code as giving a right 
with no remedy: taking the view that a person injured by a dangerous dog has the right compensation 
for injuries sustained, plus costs and civil judgments, but the same person may not pursue the civil 
judgments. That is not how the law works. 
The Bos,vell v. Steele summary judgment decision was not a proper application ofldaho law 
or Idaho jurisprudence. 
For these reasons the decision should be reversed. 
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